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Abstract 
Empirical findings that minorities typically attain lower economic status than majorities and that relatively larger 
minorities perform worse than smaller ones pose a challenge to economics. To explain this scale puzzle, I model an 
economy  where  the  society  is  bifurcated  into  two  social  groups  that  differ  in  their  size  and  sociocultural 
characteristics  –  the  minority  and  the  majority  –  and  individuals  form  their  human  capital  through  social 
interaction in social networks. I establish that the different social group sizes and the sociocultural differences 
suffice to generate earnings inequality between the two social groups whenever sociocultural differences hinder 
social  interaction  between  majority  and  minority  individuals  and  there  are  networks  effects  in  human  capital 
acquisition. If there are, in addition, asymmetric information in the labor market and a choice of heterogeneous 
skills in the economy, minority and majority individuals tend to acquire different (combinations of) skills and the 
predicted patterns of income inequality comply with the scale puzzle under fairly general conditions. Moreover, in 
this study I offer an answer why some minorities do better than majorities, why minority individuals tend to spend 
more time socializing in families than in schools, and why integration may harm minorities. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Inequalities in socioeconomic conditions of Black and White Americans, Romany and White 
Europeans,  and  other  minorities  and  majorities  around  the  world  are  persistent  and  central 
features of the worldly history.
1 While there are many dimensions of socioeconomic inequality, 
labor income, as one of the major measures and determinants of socioeconomic inequality, is the 
principal focus of this study.
2 Two robust empirical findings about the distribution of income 
across social groups
3 pose a challenge to economic theory. On the one hand, minorities typically 
earn  less  income  per  capita  than  majorities.  On  the  other  hand,  minority-majority  income 
disparities  vary  directly  with  the  relative  size  of  minority  populations  across  habitats.  The 
puzzling feature of this empirical regularity is that while being a member of the smaller social 
group in a habitat – the minority – is disadvantageous in income terms, given the minority status, 
minority agents are relatively better off in habitats where they are relatively less plentiful.  
 
This  “scale  puzzle”  has  been  a  major  topic  of  sociologists
4,  who  have  offered  several 
explanations thereof, referring to the social embeddednes of individuals with a special focus on 
ethnic  discrimination.  In  their  studies,  however,  the  economic  nature  of  socioeconomic 
inequality  and  human  beings  per  se  has  been  sparsely  addressed.  Economics  of  income 
inequality, on the other hand, has always been at the center of economic research. Economists, 
habitually  adopting  the  canon  of  Homo  economicus,  have  contributed  significantly  to  our 
understanding of how economic forces aggravate or alleviate inequality among economic actors. 
                                                 
1  Throughout  the  paper,  minority  is  understood  to  be  a  particular  racial,  ethnic,  religious  or  national  group  of 
individuals who share socio-cultural characteristics such as culture, religion, language, history, beliefs, customs, 
values, and morals that make them distinct from the rest of the population – the majority – in their habitat. While 
there may be regions where the minority outnumbers the majority, that minorities constitute smaller proportion of 
population  than  majorities  is  a  part  of  most  definitions  of  the  minority  and  I  adopt  this  premise  here  as  well. 
Although this study explicitly studies the mentioned social groups, it can be straightforwardly extended to nominal 
social groups defined by gender, language, or the like if they are sufficiently distinct from the rest of the society in 
terms of their socio-cultural characteristics. The study does not deal with social groups formed on the basis of 
occupation, wealth, or other ordinal characteristics. 
2  Acknowledging  that  the  dispute  over  proper  measures  of  socio-economic  attainment  is  perennial,  the  most 
promoted measures being individual income, educational attainment, life expectancy, health status, occupational 
status,  or  any  combination  thereof,  I  focus  in  this  paper  on  individual  labor  income  and  earnings  inequality. 
Nevertheless, some predictions of the theory for educational attainment are discussed as well in the end of the paper. 
3 Social group is understood to be a minority or a majority.  
4 Both the sociological and economic literatures are discussed below.   3
The  embeddedness  of  individuals  in  social  interaction  with  its  consequences  for  income 
distribution has received a much smaller portion of their attention until recently, however.          
 
That economic analysis can improve our understanding of labor income inequality across social 
groups is natural to expect. After all, the major determinants of this inequality certainly include 
wages,  productivities,  and  resource  allocations.  But  why  does  income  inequality  depend  on 
social  group  membership  and  social  group  sizes  in  particular?  Recalling  the  definition  of 
minority, at least two fundamental features distinguish minorities from majorities. First, there are 
sociocultural characteristics that make the two social groups distinct. Behaviorally, social groups 
may  abide  by  different  morals  and  taboos,  speak  different  languages,  have  different 
understanding  of  what  proper  behavior  is,  or  have  different  customs  in  interpersonal 
communication.  In  addition,  there  often  are  some  observable  characteristics  of  social  group 
membership such as skin color, ethnic names and surnames, or accent. Second, it is indeed the 
different size of social groups that distinguishes them, as minorities typically constitute smaller 
proportion of population than majorities.
5  
 
Can the variation in sizes of social groups coupled with the sociocultural differences explain the 
patterns  of  inequality?  While  the  latter  by  itself  cannot,  as  the  differences  are  in  principle 
completely  symmetric
6,  the  group  size  differences  introduce  aggregate  asymmetry  that  may 
induce income inequality on the individual level. In this paper I argue that it is social interaction 
in human capital acquisition that links this aggregate asymmetry with income inequality between 
minority and majority individuals. In particular, I establish that different social group sizes and 
the sociocultural differences suffice to produce income inequality between the two social groups 
whenever  sociocultural  differences  hinder  social  interaction  between  majority  and  minority 
individuals and there are networks effects
7 in human capital acquisition. If there is, in addition, 
asymmetric information in the labor market and a choice of heterogeneous skills in the economy, 
                                                 
5 To wit, according to Frisbie and Neidert (1977), the average proportion of Mexican Americans in the population of 
southwestern Standard Metropolitan Areas of the U.S. was 14.7% (V=10.3), that of Blacks was 8.1% (V=6.8). 
6 This symmetry is assumed throughout the paper. Assuming a priori asymmetry of sociocultural differences would 
be ad hoc and racially prejudiced.  
7  Network  effects  arise  whenever  benefits  from  a  good  or  service,  here  the  service  of  social  network  in  skill 
acquisition process, increase in the number of individuals already owning that good or using that service. One 
consequence of a network effect is that the use of a network service by one individual indirectly benefits others who 
use it. This side effect in a transaction is known as network externality.   4
individuals tend to acquire different (combinations of) skills and the predicted patterns of income 
inequality comply with the scale puzzle under fairly general conditions.  
 
The  argument  proceeds  as  follows.  First,  I  discuss  empirical  evidence  about  the  patterns  of 
income  inequality  and  establish that it validates the existence of the scale puzzle. Second, I 
discuss alternative theoretical explanations of the scale puzzle found in both sociological and 
economic literature. Third, I state and explain the main assumptions on which the argument is 
based. Fourth, I present a formal model and establish its main predictions. Finally, I discuss the 
relevance of the presented theory and conclude.    
 
2.  The Scale Puzzle 
 
A glimpse at the contemporary United States reveals a pattern of income inequality across the 
major U.S. ethnic minorities that is strikingly consistent with the scale puzzle (c.f. Table 1). In 
particular, we observe that larger minorities have relatively lower income than smaller ones and 
that the two largest U.S. minorities are on average significantly poorer than the majority. To wit, 
the  largest  minority,  the  Black  minority,  attains  only  about  64%  of  the  income  of the  Non-
Hispanic White majority, the Hispanic minority is between the two other minorities both in terms 
of relative size and income at about 74% of majority income, and the smallest minority, the 
Asian  and  Pacific  Islander  minority,  outperforms  the  other  two  minorities.  Interestingly,  the 
smallest minority also outperforms the majority, suggesting that the benefits from minority’s 
smaller size can outweigh the detriments of being a minority.   
 
Table 1 
Race  and  Hispanic  Origin  of 
Householder 
Number of Households  
(Percent in Total) 
Median Income in Dollars  
(Percent of Non-Hispanic White) 
Non-Hispanic White  73.94  100.00 
Black  12.18  63.64 
Hispanic  9.61  72.49 
Asian and Pacific Islander  3.72  115.83 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2002 and 2001 Annual Demographic Supplements and author’s computations.   5
2.1. Empirical Literature 
That minorities typically earn less income than majorities and that minority-majority income 
disparities vary directly with the relative size of the minority across habitats – the scale puzzle – 
has been corroborated in a sizeable empirical literature (c.f. Table 2). Blalock (1956) studied the 
relationship  between  minority-majority  income  differentials  and  percent  Black  in  88  non-
Southern and Southern Standard Metropolitan Areas (SMAs). Using various control variables 
and  data  samples,  he  finds  the  correlations  to  range  between  nonsignificant  .19  and  highly 
significant .70, with most correlations in the upper significant part of the range. In another study, 
Blalock (1957) investigated the same relationship on the random sample of 150 Southern U.S. 
counties and found the correlation to be .46. In both studies Blalock provides evidence for non-
linearity of the relationship, suggesting that very small and very large minorities achieve better 
economic status than what would the linear relationship predict.  Using a different measure of 
income  inequality,  Heer  (1959)  finds  a  negative  correlation  -.71  between  the  ratio  of  Black 
median income to White median income and percent Black in 43 Southern U.S. SMAs, thereby 
corroborating Blalock’s findings. Studying 878 non-metropolitan areas of Southern U.S., Brown 
and Fuguitt (1972) estimate the correlations between measures of racial income disparity and 
percent Black to range between .16 and .41. Their results are fully supported by an extensive 
study by Frisbie and Neidert (1977) in 40 southwestern U.S. SMAs, who find the correlations 
between income disparities and minority labor market percentages to range between .22 to .48 
for  the  Mexican  minority  and  .31  to  .43  for  the  Black  minority.  Both  studies  report 
overrepresentation of the majority in all higher income categories and show that Black income 
decreases and White income increases with increases in percent Black. Hirschman and Wong 
(1984) estimate income gaps between minority and majority individuals for Black, Hispanic, 
Chinese,  Japanese,  and  Filipino  men  in  1960,  1970,  and  1976.  They  find  the  gaps  to  be 
significant in most cases. The only exception is the Japanese, a relatively small minority, who 
actually outperformed the Whites in 1976. Suggestive is the pattern that the larger minorities, 
Black  and  Hispanic,  lag  substantially  more  than  the  smaller  ones,  Chinese,  Japanese,  and 
Filipino. Finally, Tienda and Lii (1987) test the scale puzzle using microdata samples of Black, 
Hispanic, Asian and White men from 1980 to confirm that minorities lag behind majorities in 
income  terms  and  that  minority  labor  market  percentages  favor  the  majority  while 
disadvantaging the minorities themselves, thereby validating the scale puzzle.    6
Table 2 
Study  Data  Main Findings  Notes 
Blalock (1956)  88  non-Southern  and 
Southern  Standard 
Metropolitan  Areas 
(SMAs), (1950)  
Finds  a  positive  correlation  .42  between  percent  Black 
population  and  Black-White  income  differentials. 
Controlling  for  subregion,  white  median  income,  size  of 
SMA, and percent of employed males in manufacturing, the 
correlation was reduced to nonsignificant .19. However, for 
southern SMAs the correlation was .50 and increased to .70 
when the same controls were included. When both Southern 
and non-Southern SMAs were included, the correlation was 
.67 irrespective of the controls.  
Suggests  that  the  marginal  Black  relative 
losses  due  to  percent  increase  are 
decreasing (non-linearity) in percent Black. 
Suspects  a  threshold  at  about  10%  above 
which correlations significant. 
Blalock (1957)  Random sample of 150 
Southern  US  counties 
having at least 250 non-
white  households, 
(1950) 
Finds  a  positive  correlation  between  percent  Black 
population  and  income  (.46)  and  educational  (.68) 
differentials. The findings were robust with respect to the 
same controls as in Blalcok (1956)  
Finds  that  in  counties  with  low  Black 
percentage (but not in those with high Black 
percentage  where  all  results  were  non-
significant)  the  income  and  educational 
gaps  are  disproportionaly  smaller,  thereby 
supporting the non-linearity hypothesis for 
the low end of the density continuum. No 
relationship  is  observed  for  occupational 
differentials. 
Heer (1959)  43  Southern  Standard 
Metropolitan  Areas, 
Census, (1950) 
Finds negative correlation of -.71 between percent Black and 
the ratio of Black median income to White median income. 
 
Brown  and 
Fuguitt (1972) 
878  non-metropolitan 
areas, Southern US, PH-
5 census, (1960) 
Report  overrepresentation  of  the  majority  in  all  higher 
income groups (difference scores range between 31% and 
45% when cumulative distributions are compared). Find that 
the association between percent Black and measures of racial 
income disparity is positive and ranges between .16 and .41. 
Moreover, they show that Black income decreases and White 
income  increases  with  increases  in  percent  Black.  White 
component  correlations range between .12 and .21. Black 
counterparts range between -.09 and -.31. 
 
Positive  relationship  is  observed  for 
occupational differentials. 
Frisbie  and 
Neidert 
(1977) 
40  Standard 
Metropolitan  Areas  in 
southwestern  U.S.  U.S. 
Bureau  of  the  Census, 
(1971, 1972)  
Report  overrepresentation  of  the  majority  in  all  higher 
income  groups  (difference  scores  range  between  7%  and 
20%  (Mexican)  between  18%  and  31%  (Black)  when 
cumulative distributions are compared). Finds correlations of 
.22 to .48 between percent Mexican and the Mexican-Anglo 
income  differential  for  different  income  groups.  The 
corresponding values for the Blacks range between 0.31 and 
0.43. Controls included: % labor force in manufacturing, % 
labor force in services, Black median education, 1960-1970 
%  change  in  Black  population, % Mexican. Uncontrolled 
correlations  similar.  Confirms that the majority income is 
positively  correlated  with  percent  minority  (correlations 
between .06 and .21) and that minority income is negatively 
correlated with percent minority (correlations between -.48 
and -.22). 
Studies two minorities and a majority in a 
habitat. 
Hirschman  and 
Wong (1984) 
Census  of  the 
Population,  (1960, 
1970) and the Survey of 
Income  and  Education 
(1976) 
Finds  substantial  socioeconomic  gaps  between  White 
majority and Black (1960: -$5700 of yearly income, 1970: -
$6000,  1976:  -$4400),  Hispanic  (1960:  -$3500,  1970:  -
$3700, 1976: -$3400), Chinese (1960: -$1000, 1970: -$800, 
1976: -$1200), and Filipino (1960: -$3200, 1970: -$3500, 
1976:  $0)  men.  Japanese  men  outperform  White  men  in 
1976 (1960: -$900, 1970: $0, 1976: +$1700). Nonsignificant 
values reported as zeros; all values 1975 $.  
 
Suggestive  is  the  pattern  that  larger 
minorities (Black and Hispanic) do worse 
than smaller ones (Japanese, Chinese, and 
Filipino). Occupational attainments: strong 
negative  effects  of  percent  Minority  for 
Black,  Hispanic,  and  Filipino,  non-
significant  for  Japanese,  and  positive  for 
Chinese.  
Tienda  and  Lii 
(1987) 
5% A File, men, Public 
Use Microdata Samples, 
Census (1980) 
Confirms that minorities have lower income than majorities 
and that minorities lose from increases in their percentages, 
while  the  white  majority  gains.    Blacks,  Hispanics,  and 
Asians lose 0.7%, 0.2%, and $0.2% of their annual income, 
respectively, and the majority gains between 0.0-0.5% with 
every percentage increase of the respective minority density. 
These  results  are  net  of  some  observable  individual 
characteristics and working time measures.  
Minority losses from their percentages most 
pronounced for educated minority people. 
   7
2.2. Theoretical Literature 
The scale puzzle has attracted a lot of attention among theoreticians.
8 Two early works, Williams 
(1947) and Allport (1954), followed by more elaborated studies by Blalock (1967), Noel (1968), 
and  Reich  (1971)  argue  that  when  social  groups  are  competing  over  scarce  resources,  the 
hostility  of  superordinate  majorities,  who  control  job  opportunities,  against  minorities  is 
increasing in the relative size of the minority as the former fear the greater job competition 
caused  by  the  larger  number  of  the  latter.  This  argument  was  extended  by  Bonacich  (1972, 
1976), who argues that ethnic antagonism increases in the size of the minority and results in split 
labor markets that protect the rents appropriated by majorities.  
 
Another  strand  of literature, represented by Glenn (1964), Spilerman and Miller (1977), and 
Semyonov et al. (1984), advocates that, given the discrimination-based asymmetry of job status 
distribution between minority and majority, an increase in the population of subordinate minority 
workers increases the supply of low-skill labor predominantly supplied by the minority, thereby 
crowding out majority workers from the low status jobs into more lucrative ones and, as a result, 
widening the socio-economic gap. That discrimination keeping minority workers subordinate in 
low  status  jobs  is  increasingly  worthwhile  to  employers  as  the  relative  size  of  minority 
population in a given market increases was advocated by Thurow (1969).  
 
While  these  sociological  studies  provide  in-depth  analyses  of  associations  between  social 
superstructure and socioeconomic differentiation across social groups, they remain superficial 
about the consequences of changes in ethnic composition and social structure on the economics 
of the minority-majority inequality, including the determination of relative wages, employment 
opportunities,  and  individual  incentives.  In  addition,  both  strands  of  literature  rely  on  the 
assumption that minorities are extensively subordinate relative to majorities with respect to job 
statuses, economic opportunities, and abilities to maintain or change the subordination. Although 
such asymmetries may be a plausible premise in a short run analysis, it is less so in the long run 
perspective, unless we establish that these asymmetries are everlastingly perpetuated. Moreover, 
the existence of minorities that outperform majorities is either unexplained by these theories or 
contradicts the job status asymmetry assumption.  
                                                 
8 I dismiss all theories based on any kind of genetic predispositions as empirically unfounded and invidious.   
   8
Economists have addressed the issue of ethnic inequality from two closely related perspectives. 
First, they study how discrimination drives a wedge between the labor market rewards of ethnic 
groups with the same levels of human capital and other production factors. Second, they aim to 
explain the quantitative differences in individual human capital across social groups. From the 
first perspective, following Becker (1957) and materializing in Welch (1967) and Arrow (1972a, 
1972b,  1973),  discrimination-driven  economic  inequality  is  viewed  as  a  demand  driven 
phenomenon arising due to the so-called “taste for discrimination” of actors on the labor market. 
There  are,  however,  at  least  three  arguments  that  undermine  the  “taste  for  discrimination” 
premise. First, this premise, although it does not contradict the rational choice theory, is ad hoc, 
with respect to any social inequality argument. Second, it contradicts the economic theory. If 
discrimination is purely race based, the discriminating employers either make losses (if they pay 
more than the marginal product) or they are competed away by nondiscriminating employers (if 
they pay less) in competitive labor market. Third, because those employers that discriminate 
more  are  economically  less  successful  than  the  less  discriminating  ones
9,  the  Darwinian 
evolution  would  eliminate  them  and  in  the  limit  spare  only  the  nondiscriminating  ones. 
Moreover, the assumption that it is the majority who controls most employment opportunities is 
inconsistent with another Becker’s assumption that there is perfect competition on the demand 
side of the labor market.
10  
 
From  the  second  perspective,  early  works  addressing  the  supply  side  of  income  inequality 
include Becker and Tomes (1979) and Loury (1981), who argue that intergenerational transfers 
of ability to acquire human capital result in human capital variation across families and thereby 
generate income inequality. Shifting the focus from the family to the neighborhood, Benabou 
(1993, 1996) and Durlauf (1994, 1996) explain how persistent income stratification may arise as 
the  consequence  of  social  and  geographical  stratification  due  to  local  public  goods  or 
neighborhood externalities and the resulting uneven access to education across neighborhoods. 
More recent studies in this vein include Steele (1992), Akerlof (1997), and Lundberg and Starz 
(1998), who explicitly account for the role of social interaction in human capital distribution and 
suggest that it is the social or psychological (dynamic) externalities in segregated neighborhoods 
                                                 
9 This is because discriminating agents deviate from economically most efficient choices to satisfy their preference 
for discrimination.  
10 c.f. Darity (1982, pp. 72-75) and Arrow (1998) for a discussion.   9
or workplaces that promote social and economic inequalities. For example, Lundberg and Starz 
(1998)  explain  how  initial  disadvantages  of  minorities  such  as  those  engendered  by  past 
discrimination  can  be  sustained  indefinitely.  While  explaining  variation  of  income  across 
families and neighborhoods, these studies do not, however, provide a systematic explanation of 
minority-majority income inequality and the scale puzzle in particular.  
 
Another approach to ethnic inequality, including the recent works of Lundberg and Starz (2002) 
and Coate and Loury (1993), who build on the groundbreaking ideas of Phelps (1972), Arrow 
(1972a, 1972b, 1973), and Aigner and Cain (1977), combines the two economic perspectives 
studying  the  consequences  of  asymmetric  information  between  suppliers  and  employers  of 
human capital. Statistical discrimination is a form of asymmetric information in the labor market 
arising when important individual characteristics of the employee are not observable by the other 
party of the contract, the employer, but there are some observable individual characteristics, such 
as race, that are used by the employers as a proxy for the unobservable characteristics, the power 
of these proxies being based on past experience or statistical investigation. This approach either 
assumes external asymmetry with respect to risk of employing employees from different social 
groups
11, or asymmetry of prior beliefs of employers regarding abilities of employees of different 
races that are, in turn, substantiated through employees reaction to the asymmetric incentives to 
acquire human capital.
12 While the risk asymmetry hypothesis is rather ad hoc, theories based on 
self-fulfilled prior belief asymmetry perhaps offer a better account of the economic history of 
racial inequality. Yet, asymmetric prior beliefs are often difficult to rationalize and remain ad 
hoc with respect to the social inequality argument.
13  
 
Remarkable is the study of Lundberg and Starz (2002) who, in the search framework, provide an 
explanation of ethnic inequality without assuming any prior asymmetry across individuals. These 
authors assume imperfect information about the return to transactions with particular individuals. 
                                                 
11 Such as higher variance of skill distribution of black workers or better predictive powers of screening tests for 
white workers, c.f. Darity (1982). 
12 Alternatively, a prior asymmetry on the supply side is assumed to justify itself through employers’ beliefs and the 
reaction of employees thereto. 
13 Immigration of unskilled workers can rationalize a priori initial asymmetry on the supply side. For example, Topel 
(1997) argues that human capital differences arise as the consequence of immigration of unskilled minority workers, 
who  decrease  average  human  capital  in  the  minority  population.  In  the  statistical  discrimination  context,  such 
transitory asymmetries may become permanent.     10
Race arising as a signal of these returns, different group sizes are shown to suffice to engender 
the  asymmetry  between  the  returns  to  learning  and  the  preferential  treatment  of  the  more 
populous majority agents on the labor market and may lead to exclusion of minority agents form 
employment opportunities. Two issues arise, however. First, in odds with the empirical evidence, 
the  model  predicts  that  larger  minorities  are  less  likely  to  be  excluded  and  disadvantaged. 
Second, it does not explain why some minorities outperform majorities.  
 
2.3. Contribution 
In this paper, I provide a novel theoretical explanation of the link between the relative size of 
minority population and its relative economic achievement. In contrast to the aforementioned 
sociological studies, the economics of income inequality is thoroughly analyzed in a general 
equilibrium  model.  In  comparison  to  the  economic  studies  discussed  above,  I  systematically 
explain, focusing on the social and institutional organization of the economy, why inter-group 
asymmetry  of  benefits  from  social  interaction  arises  despite  the  prior  homogeneity  of 
individuals. I establish that, to explain that asymmetry, no ad hoc “taste for discrimination”, prior 
beliefs assumption, neither any assumption asymmetric with respect to individual characteristics 
is  necessary.  In  addition,  rather  than  studying  neighborhood,  social,  and  psychological 
externalities  given  the  (initial)  patterns  of  segregation,  in  this  study  the  mutually  dependent 
degree  of  segregation  and  benefits  from  social  interaction  are  simultaneously  determined. 
Moreover, no a priori disadvantage of the minority, such as past discrimination, is necessary to 
explain  the  minority-majority  income  inequality.  Importantly,  as  contrasted  to  Lundberg  and 
Starz (2002), I shift the focus from the role of organization of social interaction in job allocation 
on its role in human capital acquisition. Moreover, I highlight the role of the variation of price 
per  unit  of  efficient  labor  in  determining  income  inequality  between  social  groups.  Finally, 
within this study, I explain why some minorities attain higher economic status than majorities 
and I argue that minorities not only typically lag behind majorities in terms of income per capita 
but also that they lag more when they are relatively bigger, thereby explaining the scale puzzle.  
 
   11
3.  The Determination of Minority-Majority Earnings Inequality 
 
Variation of labor income across individuals reflects variation of the value of their efficient labor 
– the composite of time and skills – on the labor market. The value of efficient labor can be 
divided into price and quantity components. Of these, the quantitative variance of efficient labor 
has  received  most  attention  by  students  of  inequality,  such  as  those  mentioned  above,  who 
habitually  assume  that  the  price  of  efficient  labor  is  invariant  across  individuals  due  to 
homogeneity of efficient labor. While this assumption may be appropriate in many contexts, I 
argue that it is inappropriate in the context of ethnic inequality. The reason is that, as I establish 
below,  sociocultural  differences  that  hinder  social  interaction  between  minority  and  majority 
agents and asymmetric social group sizes, through network effects in skill acquisition, tend to 
expose members of different ethnic groups to different incentive structures in skill acquisition 
and thus motivate them to acquire different (combinations of) skills. If skills qualitatively vary 
across individuals, that is, if individuals have different skills, the prices of their efficient labor 
vary as well, because individual efficient labors are no longer perfect substitutes. As a result of 
the imperfect substitutability, two important effects emerge. Given the quantity of individual’s 
efficient  labor,  labor  market  earnings  of  an  individual  decrease  in the aggregate quantity of 
efficient labor of her type in the labor market due to the textbook economic law that, ceteris 
paribus, more abundant goods sell at lower price. On the other hand, however, her labor market 
earnings directly increase in the quantity of her individual efficient labor, given the unit price and 
thus the aggregate quantity thereof. To establish the existence of these effects and to determine 
their relative strengths, it is important to understand the social embeddedness of human capital 
acquisition and its consequences.   
 
3.1. Social Networks and Human Capital Acquisition 
Since the works of Becker (1962), Mincer (1958), and Schultz (1961), economists have typically 
conceptualized human capital – the collection of skills that constitute efficient labor – as a rival 
and excludable production factor, similar in its production and use to physical capital. While this 
simplification  facilitated  development  of  many  insightful  theories,  it  neglected  an  important 
feature of human capital that, as Lucas (1988, p.19) points out, “human capital accumulation is a   12
social activity, involving groups of people in a way that has no counterpart in the accumulation 
of physical capital.”
14 Social embeddedness of human capital acquisition, as conceptualized in 
the  pioneering  works  of  Rees  and  Schultz  (1972),  Loury  (1977),  Bourdieu  (1986), Coleman 
(1988, 1990), and Granovetter (1973, 1974, 1985), is central to my argument. According to these 
authors, human capital is acquired in social interaction along social ties that constitute social 
networks – established structures of social ties among actors in a social system. A number of 
scholars, such as Dore (1983), Powell (1990), and Uzzi  (1997) have stressed the role of network 
forms of organization in learning. Two main mechanisms through which network organizations 
foster  learning  found  in  the  literature  are,  first,  channeling  interpersonal  exchange  of 
information,  e.g.  Root  (1988),  Hamel  (1991)  and  Kogut  (1988),  and,  second,  facilitating 
synthesis of pieces of information that were previously located in distinct nodes, e.g. Powel and 
Brantley (1992). A sizeable literature focuses on the role of social networks in social learning. 
Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) study a model in which communicational structure determines the 
sets of agents with whom individuals share experience. Valente (1995), Feick and Price (1987), 
Gladwell (2000), and Foster and Rosensweig (1995) substantiate such approach and observe that 
social learning is a significant vehicle of human capital accumulation. These authors document 
that  colleagues,  friends,  or  neighbors  share  information  about  their  discoveries,  experiment 
outcomes, or search results. Conley and Udry (2002), Munshi (2002), and Bandiera and Rasul 
(2001) empirically corroborate the premise that social networks significantly affect individual 
adoption of new technologies. In line with these concepts, I conceptualize individual human 
capital to be the composite of individual skills, capabilities, and expertise
15 that are acquired 
through time consuming learning that involves social interaction in social networks and that, 
coupled with working time, constitute individual efficient labor valued by the labor market.  
 
That the benefits from social interaction are increasing in the number of people involved and the 
pieces of information to exchange and synthesize they hold – the size of social network – is a 
straightforward corollary of the aforementioned arguments about the role of social interaction 
and social networks in social learning. It leads to the first essential assumption about the effects 
of social interaction on human capital acquisition on which the main argument of this paper is 
                                                 
14 Italics are in the original. 
15 Below all referred to as “skills”.    13
based. Namely, I assume that skill acquisition process exhibits network effects that positively 
depend on the size of the network in which the particular skill is acquired. In other words, while 
an agent may be able to acquire a skill alone, that is, in a network of zero measure, the efficiency 
of her learning is increasing in the number of people that acquire the same skill, engaging in 
social  interaction  with  this  agent  in  the  skill-specific  social  network.
16  Because  most  social 
interactions in social networks do not involve pecuniary remuneration for the benefits that one’s 




There are several arguments that social interaction is prevalent in skill acquisition. Technically, 
there are two extreme modes of learning processes. In the one, agents acquire skills in social 
interaction  with  people  who  facilitate  their  skill  acquisition.  In  the  other  one,  an  individual 
acquires skills without any social interaction using a perfect blueprint how to acquire a particular 
skill.  First,  I  argue  that  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  all  skills  are  acquired  without  any  social 
interaction. Any theory assuming the existence of a complete set of blueprints for every skill 
available to everyone such that social interaction is unnecessary is exceedingly unrealistic. Even 
if one allowed for the existence of such a complete set, it would be problematical to rule out any 
benefits from social interaction in learning and the resulting involvement therein. Furthermore, to 
rule out indirect social interaction it is necessary to assume away any dependence of the quality 
and availability of blueprints on the number of people that use them. Second, strengthening the 
claim, I contend that skills are mostly acquired in social interaction. Examples of interactive skill 
acquisition  include  learning  in  families,  friendship  circles,  schools, workplaces, sports clubs, 
student societies, religious circles, kinships, and many others. All these examples support the 
premise  that  people  engage  in  and  benefit  from  social  interaction  in  the  process  of  skill 
acquisition. Certainly, people also read textbooks, cookbooks, articles, watch television, listen to 
radio and browse the Internet, where typically no direct social interaction is involved. However, 
                                                 
16 A doubt may arise from the possibility that the benefits from social interaction are decreasing in the number of 
interacting people whenever the size of the network exceeds certain threshold; that the congestion effect may arise. 
While  I  agree  that  this  is  theoretically  possible,  rational  agents  would  never  voluntarily  engage  in  interactive 
learning that would exceed such threshold, even if the physical network size would. Nonetheless, the existence of 
such threshold level does not undermine the main insights of this paper.  
17 In fact, that network effects are external can be seen as the consequence of perfect competition among actual or 
potential network members that eliminates, given the zero costs of entry in networks, any pecuniary compensation 
for the incremental network effect an entrant produces to the benefit of other network members.   14
the degree of indirect social interaction in these cases is tremendous. An obvious example is the 
Internet that is, in fact, one of the prime examples of industries that generate strong network 
effects in the literature on network industries. Taking another one, cookbooks, one has to realize 
the positive effects the cook obtains from a given cookbook whenever there are many other 
cooks who use the same recipes and create a large demand for these books, thereby providing the 
publisher with strong incentives to increase availability, quality, and variety of the recipes in the 
cookbook.  In  addition,  very  often  a  cookbook  is  a  collection  of  recipes  that  are  shared  and 
improved by the readers of some magazine that also publishes the cookbook. Thus, it is in fact 
difficult to find examples of learning that do not involve social interaction.  
 
It is natural to expect that benefits from social interaction not only depend on the number of 
individuals one interacts with but also on who these individuals are. In the context of minority-
majority social interaction, sociocultural differences between minorities and majorities are likely 
to  determine  the  quality  of  social  interaction  in  any  network.  To  operationalize  these 
sociocultural differences, in line with Poole (1927), I define social distance to be the measure of 
the subjective and objective dissimilarities between social groups that hinders social interaction 
between the members of these social groups. Thus, in contrast to Akerlof (1997), who studies 
endogenous social distance between homogeneous agents, I consider social distance between 
members  of  different  social  groups  to  be  a  predetermined  variable  that  reflects  the  defining 
distinctiveness of social groups. The natural corollary of the definition of social distance above is 
that agent’s ability to benefit from social interaction in a given network negatively depends on 
her social distance to the other members of this network. Based on this argument, the second 
essential assumption of this paper is that individual benefits from network effects are decreasing 
in interpersonal social distance.  
 
3.2. Skill Heterogeneity 
To establish that minority and majority efficient labors are imperfect substitutes, an additional 
argument instituting heterogeneity of skills in the economy is necessary. Given the omnipresent 
segregation  of  social  institutions,  I  assume  that  social  structure  consists  of  institutionally 
exclusive and inclusive social networks among which agents choose to participate and acquire   15
skills.
18 I argue, in turn, that such institutional environment engenders variation of skills in the 
economy. Specifically, while inclusive networks permit any membership, any given exclusive 
network only permits memberships from one social group and thus exclusive social networks are 
segregated. Inclusive social networks may be integrated as well as segregated, depending on the 
composition  of  their  members.  The  distinction  made  in  this  paper  is  that  exclusiveness 
(inclusiveness) is understood as exogenous institutional constraint on network membership while 
segregation (integration) as endogenous variable concerning equilibrium organization of social 
interaction.  The  prime  examples  of  typically  exclusive  networks  include  families,  kinships, 
ghetto social networks, religious groups, expatriate communities, radical groups, some exclusive 
discotheques  and  clubs,  and  ethnically  or  religiously  exclusive  schools.  The list of inclusive 
networks includes most schools, student societies, and workplaces, academic communities, and 
television viewers and Internet users.  
 
Are the skills available in exclusive networks different from those available in inclusive ones? 
The examples listed above suggest that the typical exclusive and inclusive social networks are 
predisposed to be different with respect to their objectives and functions. Clearly, these reflect 
the various social roles of an agent in the society. For example the parental role of an agent is 
carried out in the family while her economic role is performed in her workplace community that 
have  very  different  objectives  and  functions.  Moreover,  nearly  tautologically,  purposefully 
exclusive networks have different objectives or functions than inclusive networks; otherwise any 
costs associated with exclusion, such as forgone network benefits, are wasteful and thus the 
efforts  to  exclude  irrational.  It  follows  that  skills  that  reflect  the  functions  or  objectives  of 
networks  in  which  they  are  acquired  are  different  across  exclusive  and  inclusive  networks. 
Another source of differentiation between skills acquired in exclusive and inclusive networks lies 
in the defining characteristics of social groups such as religion, culture, or ethnic history, as these 
are likely to be reflected more intensely in exclusive social networks than in inclusive ones. For 
example, in a religiously divided society, the skills and abilities that individuals acquire in their 
exclusive religious association are more likely to reflect religious concern than those that they 
                                                 
18 There is an enormous literature on social structure and ethnic segregation. Recent contributions include Massey 
and Denton (1993) and Farley and Frey (1994). Schelling (1978, ch. 4) argues that mild preferences to reside with 
one’s own social group suffice to produce severe residential segregation. Ethnic segregation has been documented 
by Farley and Frey (1994), Glaeser and Vigdor (2001), Reardon, Yun, and Eitle (2000).   16
acquire in inclusive associations, such as sports clubs, universities, or pubs where religion plays 
lesser  if  any  role.
19  From  a  different  viewpoint,  Annen  (2003)  studies  how  social  networks 
respond to the complexity of their environment and changes in communication technologies by 
changing their degree of exclusiveness. Because skills learned in environments with different 
complexity and communication technologies are likely to be different, the skills in exclusive and 
inclusive  networks  are  prone  to  be  different.  Based  on  these  arguments,  I  posit  that  skills 
acquired  in  exclusive  networks  are  generally  different  from  those  acquired  in  inclusive 
networks.
20 For the sake of brevity, I let “inclusive” and “exclusive” denote the respective social 
networks and skills. 
 
It  is  worthwhile  to  realize  that  none  of  the  aforementioned  essential  assumptions  by  itself 
engenders any asymmetry between members of different social groups whatsoever. However, the 
network effects and social distance assumptions taken together render the benefits that a given 
individual derives from social interaction in a given network dependent on the number and origin 
of the members of this network and the origin of this given individual. Thus, for instance, the 
network effect benefits of a minority individual in a given social network increase in the share of 
minority members in this network, given the size of the network, and these benefits are also 
different from those that a majority individual enjoys in the same network. If then, for example, 
all social networks are of the same size and composition such that there is more majority than 
minority members in every network, network effects and social distances disadvantage minority 
individuals. These two assumptions indeed suffice to establish that minorities tend to lag behind 
majorities,  as  minority  individuals  tend  to  enjoy  smaller  network  benefits  in  human  capital 
acquisition and thus acquire a lesser measure thereof.  
 
Assuming institutional heterogeneity of social networks institutionalizes heterogeneity of skills 
available in the economy and constitutes the ground for imperfect substitutability of effective 
labors of minority and majority individuals. First, as shown below, if exclusive and inclusive 
skills are good substitutes, individuals specialize and network effects and social distances may 
coordinate  individuals  such  that  skills  differ  across  social  groups,  resulting  in  imperfect 
                                                 
19 It is worthwhile to note that no a priori variation of skills across social groups is assumed here.   
20 This difference will be operationalized below. Note that no asymmetry between the market values of different 
skills is imposed here.   17
substitutability of minority and majority efficient labors. Second, if exclusive and inclusive skills 
are poor substitutes and individuals acquire both types of skills each, minority individuals tend to 
acquire  different  combination  of  skills  than  majority  individuals.  To  outline  the  argument, 
reasonably, asymmetric social group sizes are reflected in compositions of social networks. In 
particular,  on  average,  it  is  natural  to  expect  proportional  representation  of  social  groups  in 
inclusive networks and thus overrepresentation of majority relative to minority members in these 
networks.  One  could  also  argue  that,  due  to  the  greater  geographical  density  of  majority 
population, the exclusive networks of majority are easier to form and maintain than those of 
minority  and  therefore  are  larger.  These  asymmetries,  through  network  effects  and  social 
distances, cause the relative incentives to engage in exclusive and inclusive social networks to 
differ  between  members  of  different  social  groups.  As  a  consequence,  members  of  different 
social groups acquire different combinations of exclusive and inclusive skills and thus supply 
imperfectly substitutable efficient labors in this case as well.  
 
3.3. Individual Income Effect vs. Inter-Group Substitution Effect 
Based  on  the  arguments  above,  the  three  assumptions  above  engender  the  inter-group 
substitution  and  individual  income  effects
21  that  link  social  group  sizes  and  social  group 
inequality and thereby determine equilibrium income distribution. The individual income effect 
directly  rewards  individuals  for  supplying  more  efficient  labor,  given  the  unit  price  thereof. 
Ceteris paribus, members of social groups with a higher efficiency of skill acquisition process 
acquire more skills and supply more efficient labor. Because the efficiency of skill acquisition is 
a function of network effects that in turn depend on group sizes, the individual income effect 
links group sizes and individual incomes. It is natural to expect that, due to social distances, 
individuals benefit from a larger relative size of their own social group. Therefore, the individual 
income effect favors members of relatively larger social groups.  
 
Through prices, on the other hand, the inter-group substitution effect rewards members of social 
groups  that  on  aggregate  produce  less  group-specific  efficient  labor,  either  because  they  are 
small  or  because  they  have  low  per  capita  production  of  efficient  labor.  As  a  consequence, 
concerning the inter-group substitution effect, small social groups benefit from their smaller size 
                                                 
21 The choice of this terminology will become clear below.   18
directly, through the small number of suppliers of their particular kind of efficient labor, as well 
as indirectly, through their lower efficiency in producing efficient labor, as discussed above, and 
the resulting lower per capita supply thereof. Summarizing, while the inter-group substitution 
effect is decreasing in the relative size of a given social group, the individual income effect is 
increasing  in  its  size.  Thus,  as  the  relative  size  of  minority  increases,  it  benefits  from  the 
individual  income  effect  while  being  hurt  by  the  diminishing  benefits  from  the  inter-group 
substitution effect. In the analysis below I formally demonstrate that these two effects tend to 
produce the pattern of inequality between social groups that is consistent with the scale puzzle 
and establish the other important results of this paper. 
 
4.  The Model 
4.1. Demand for Efficient Labor 
In this section, I study the demand side of the labor market where the society is bifurcated into 
two social groups – the minority I and the majority J – and clarify the extent to which it accounts 
for the inter-group substitution and individual income effects. Let i and j denote the respective 
elements and I and J the respective measures of the continua of minority and majority agents. As 
argued above, I < J, in other words, the minority is less numerous than the majority. I assume 
that  all  individuals  are  identical  with  respect  to  their  preferences  and  endowments,  group 
membership excepting. Individual preferences are represented by the utility function  ) (× u  defined 
on individual consumptions of the consumption good, Ck, where k±{i, j}, such that the utility 
function satisfies  0 ) ( > × ¢ u and  0 ) ( < × ¢ ¢ u . Let the consumption good be produced by combining 
individual  efficient  labors  of  minority  agents,  Hi,  and  majority  agents,  Hj,  in  a  perfectly 
competitive  industry  according  to  the  constant  elasticity  of  substitution  (CES)  aggregate 
production function  
( ) ( ) ( )
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with the elasticity parameter r > 1.
22  
                   
                                                 
22 Proposition 4 below reveals that production function (1) can be seen as a harmless simplification of a more 
general production technology with many kinds of efficient labor in the context of this paper.   19
As suggested by Arrow (1998) and Loury (1998), I adopt the statistical discrimination hypothesis 
about  the  informational  structure  of  the  labor  market.  In  particular,  I  assume  that  while 
employers observe the aforementioned observable characteristics of social group membership of 
individuals
23 and the measure of efficient labor they supply, and thus can observe Hi and Hj, they 
are not able to directly observe the marginal product of efficient labor supplied by an individual
 
or  to  decompose  individual  efficient  labor  into  skills  and  labor  times  when  these  skills  are 
utilized.
24  From  experience  or  statistical  investigation,  however,  they  understand  that  social 
group  membership  predicts  the  marginal  product  of  individual  efficient  labor.  By  corollary, 
employees  from  the  same  social  group  are  not  distinguishable  with  respect  to  their  type  of 
efficient labor, as they do not perceptibly differ, and they always receive the same wage for a 
unit of their efficient labor.  
 
Applying the representative agent hypothesis group-wise and, given the infinitesimal measure of 
any individual, and taking all prices as given on the individual level, production function (1) 
gives rise to individual demands for efficient labors  
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where PC is the price of consumption good C and Wi and Wj are the prices per unit of efficient 
labors of the minority and majority agents, respectively. As a result of the homogeneity of degree 
one of the CES production function, the sector does not generate any profits in the equilibrium 
and we can derive that ( )
) 1 /( 1 1 1 r r r - - - + = j i C W W P .  Combining  the  demands  for  Hi  and  Hj,  I 
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where I adopt the notational convention that lower case letters denote either minority-to-majority 
or exclusive-to-inclusive ratios of the respective upper case lettered variables. Furthermore, I 
adopt a convenient normalization I+J=1. Equation (3) plainly reveals the inter-group substitution 
effect that, given a finite U, the relative wage is decreasing in the relative size of the social group 
                                                 
23 E.g. skin color, group-specific name, or accent. 
24 Thus, employers cannot remunerate employees skill-wise.    20
and its relative supply of efficient labor. Premultiplying by h and defining  k k k W H º W  to be both 
the total labor income and the only income of individual k, I derive the following expression for 
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Equation (4) is the main result from studying the demand side of the economy. It accounts for the 
inter-group  substitution  effect  and  brings  to  light  the  individual  income  effect.  In  particular, 
while the relative wage w is driven by the inter-group substitution effect and is decreasing in the 
relative per capita supply of efficient labor, h, relative income of the minority individual,  Z, 
depends, through the individual income effect, positively on h, given w. In fact, given I, the 
individual income effect overwhelms the negative dependence of w on h and individuals benefit 
from increasing their efficient labor. Markedly, the individual income effect and the inter-group 
substitution effects correspond to the standard income and substitution effect inherent in the CES 
function, which substantiates the adopted terminology.    
 
Three conditions about the relative supply of efficient labor and in particular about the network 
effects and social distances under which equation (4) produces a pattern of income inequality 
consistent with the scale puzzle for a range of values of I can be identified. First, the individual 
income effect should favor the larger social groups so that h < 1. Second, the relative weight of 
the inter-group substitution effect in income determination should be small enough (elasticity of 
substitution  U  should  be  large  enough),  so  that  the  inter-group  substitution  effect  does  not 
outweigh the individual income effect through relative wage and Z  hw < 1. Third, the marginal 
individual income effect should be smaller than the marginal inter-group substitution effect, so 
that the Z schedule is decreasing in I or, in other words, that a marginal increase in I decreases 
minority’s relative wage w more than it increases its relative efficient labor h.
25 Below, I will 
                                                 
25 Generally, if there exists a range of I for which  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 1 - + > ¢ r I I I h I h ,  ( ) 1 < I h , and U is large enough such 
that the inter-group substitution effect is relatively weak and dominated by the individual income effect so that Z<1, 
then variation in I produces a pattern of Z(I) consistent with the scale puzzle (Z<1 and Z’(I)<0) in this range of I. 
One example of such function is  ( ) ( ) ) 1 ( 1 1 I I h - + + = , where linear network effects in skill acquisition and infinite 
social distances are assumed. For example for U=6 the scale puzzle is reproduced in the range of I between 4 and 17 
percent under this specification of h.    21
show how the model satisfies these conditions when taking into account the organization of the 
supply of efficient labor. 
 
Equation  (4)  directly  shows  that  we  need  imperfect  substitutability  of minority and majority 
efficient labors to generate the inter-group substitution effect. If minority and majority efficient 
labors are perfect substitutes and thus U, equation (4) boils down to Z = h and the inter-group 
substitution  effect  is  non-operative  as  wages  per  unit  of  efficient  labor  are  equal  for  all 
individuals. As a result, as established below, network effects and social distances still cause the 
minority to lag but the lag is diminishing in the relative size of minority, contrary to the scale 
puzzle.  Therefore,  an  additional  fundamental  argument  has  to  be  made  to  explain  the  scale 
puzzle. In particular, it is essential to establish that minority and majority efficient labors are 
imperfect substitutes, that is, that U is finite. In the following section I analyze supply of efficient 
labor and show how the supplies of minority and majority efficient labor depend on the sizes of 
social groups through network effects and social distances. Most importantly, I establish that, 
under certain circumstances, network effects and social distances determine the organization of 
supply  of  efficient  labor  such  that  it  justifies  a  finite  U,  that  is,  that  minority  and  majority 
individuals choose different (combinations of) skills to acquire. 
 
4.2. Supply of Efficient Labor 
Individuals are each endowed with one unit of time that they divide between acquisition and 
utilization  of  a  variety  of  skills  that  increase  the  efficiency  of  individuals’  efficient  labor. 
Denoting exclusive and inclusive skills and network types m ± {x, n}, respectively, I assume the 
constant elasticity of substitution technology of producing efficient labor
26  
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26 In the literature, typically, efficient labor is the product of time and human capital. While it is still the case here 
that the components of efficient labor are products of time and skills that constitute human capital, I account for the 
heterogeneity of skills and conceptualize efficient labor to be the CES composite of products of time and skills.    22
and the decreasing-returns-to-scale skill acquisition technology  
( ) m k m k m k N L S , , , 1+ =
f ,                  (6) 
where Sk,m is the measure of skills of type m of agent k, Tk,m is the corresponding total time 
invested in acquiring and utilizing skills, and Lk,m is the corresponding time spent on acquiring 
the  particular  skills.  The  parameter  0 > e   denotes  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  the 
composites of different skills and time in production of individual efficient labor. Nk,m is the 
network effect in network m enjoyed by member k and  I± (0,1] is the measure of decreasing 
returns in skill acquisition.  
 
In general, there can be more skills of any given type in the economy. For the sake of tractability, 
I assume that skills differ only along the one dimension discussed above, that is, whether they are 
exclusive or inclusive. Given this assumption, in Proposition 3 below it is established that in any 
stable equilibrium there are no agents involved in more than one social network of any given 
type, exclusive or inclusive. In this sense, equation (5) is a harmless simplification of a more 
general technology with an arbitrary number of exclusive and inclusive skills acquired in the 
corresponding social networks. 
 
Given the difference of exclusive and inclusive skills, from the production technology (5) we see 
that the qualitative properties of individual efficient labor are determined by the combination of 
skills that constitute efficient labor. I operationalize this qualitative variation of efficient labor 
such  that  efficient  labors  that  consist  of  different  (combinations  of)  skills  are  imperfect 
substitutes  on  the  labor  market.  If,  for  example,  the  skills  of  one  agent  are  predominantly 
exclusive  and  the  skills  of  the  other  agent  are  predominantly  inclusive,  the  elasticity  of 
substitution between the efficient labors of these two agents is finite.  
 
Having explained the structure of the economy, individuals maximize their utility, taking their 
resource constraints, available technologies, network effects, wages, and the price level as given. 
From the properties of the utility function it follows that the agents’ problem boils down to 
k
T L
k H Max H
m k m k , , ,
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*                   (7) 
subject to (5), (6), and the resource constraints  0 , ³ m k T ,  0 , ³ m k L , and  1 , , £ + n k x k T T .    23
Proposition 1 
In the economy where individuals solve the problem specified in (7), given the total time 
spent on skill m by agent k, Tk,m, individuals divide their time between acquisition and 
utilization of skills according to the rule 
m k m k T L , , 1 f
f
+
= .                  (8) 
Proof in Appendix 1. 
 
Proposition 1 says that agent k spends a fixed share  ( ) f f + 1  of the time Tk,m that he allocates to 
skill m on acquisition of this skill. The rest of this time,  ( ) m k T , 1 1 f + , or Tk,m - Lk,m, is spent on 
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Proposition 2 
In the economy where agents solve the problem specified in (7), network effects and 
wages are taken as given by individuals, wages are invariant within any social group, and 
( ) f f e 1 + ³ , a maximum arises as a corner solution where all the time available to an 
individual is spent on acquisition and utilization of the one skill whose acquisition is most 
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On the other hand, whenever ( ) f f e 1 + < , the interior solution  
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Proof in Appendix 2. 
 
Corresponding to interior and corner solutions in Proposition 2, I define two classes of regimes – 
specialization  and  diversification.  In  particular,  I  call  diversification  the  class  of  regimes  in 
which every agent acquires both types of skills, exclusive and inclusive. Formally, these are 
regimes in which Tk,m>0 for all k and m. Similarly, the class of regimes when agents specialize in 
either exclusive or inclusive skills is called specialization. These are regimes in which Tk,m=0 for 
some  m.  From  Proposition  2,  specialization  regimes  prevail  if  and  only  if  ( ) f f e 1 + ³   and 
diversification regimes prevail if and only if  ( ) f f e 1 + < .
27 
 
Given  the  results  for 
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and, under diversification, 
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As we see, the relative supply of efficient labor is fully determined by network effects and time 
allocation in skill acquisition. In particular, it does not depend on wages. The reason is that 
                                                 
27 In general, there may be dual regimes in which agents of one social group diversify while agents of the other 
social group specialize. Because the choice to diversify or specialize entirely depends on parameters H and I of the 
model and these are assumed to be the same for every agent in the economy, I disregard these cases here. The 
rationale for this approach is that the emphasis in this paper is put on the question how network effects engender 
heterogeneity  of  human  capitals  of  minority  and  majority  and  how  this  heterogeneity  translates  into  income 
inequality when individual characteristics are the same for both social groups.   25
individuals take wages as given and skill acquisition does not involve any pecuniary exchange. 
To determine tk and Nk,m, we need to specify network effects and investigate the allocation of 
individual  involvements  across  networks  under  the  various  equilibrium  regimes  of  skill 
acquisition. 
 
4.3. Network Effects and the Equilibrium Regimes of Skill Acquisition 
In the skill acquisition technology, (6), network effects play a pivotal role in determining the 
efficiency of acquiring skills in a social network and thus the equilibrium allocation of individual 
involvements across social networks. In line with the arguments above, network effects that any 
given agent k enjoys in network m depend on the extent of social interaction in this network, 
which  is  measured  by  the  total  time  agents  spend  in  this  network.
28  Consistently  with  the 
assumption about social distance, agents benefit more from interaction with ethnically similar 
agents as compared to ethnically distant agents. This effects is captured by the social distance 
parameter G>0. For the sake of the clarity of exposition, I posit that the one-dimensional social 
distance  parameter  completely  represents  the  multidimensional  dissimilarities  between  the 
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where the parameter  J±(0,1] captures decreasing returns to involvement of agents in a social 
network  and  Im  and  Jm  are  the  numbers  of,  respectively,  minority  and  majority  members  in 
network m. These numbers depend on the organization of skill acquisition as discussed below. 
Alternatively, when convenient, I will assume that network effects do not depend on the time 
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28 Due to infinitesimal measure of an agent, I disregard the distinction between the total time spent in network m and 
the time that agents other than the given agent k spend in this network.     26
Throughout the paper I assume that agents take network effects as given, given the infinitesimal 
measure  of  any  individual.  Having  specified  network  effects,  we  can  state  the  following 
propositions about stable equilibrium regimes of skill acquisition:  
 
Proposition 3 
In any stable equilibrium, no agent is involved in more than one network of any given 
type, exclusive or inclusive.  
 
Proof:  
Given that skills of any given type are perfectly substitutable on the individual level, as 
they do not differ, individuals pick those social networks of the given type that offer the 
largest network effects and thus are the most efficient. Assume there is an equilibrium 
with an individual violating the proposition thus involved in two networks of a given 
type. It must then be that the network effects in these two networks are the same for this 
individual; otherwise she would pick the one that is more efficient. Such equilibrium is 
unstable,  however.  Given  that  network  effects  increase  in  agents’  involvements,  any 
marginal deviation in allocation of agents causes the network effects between the two 
networks to differ and, as a consequence, the agent to abandon the less efficient network. 
Obviously,  the  reaction  of  the  other  individuals  to  such  marginal  deviation  does  not 
stabilize the equilibrium, as network effects are increasing in individual involvements. 
This completes the proof. 
 
Proposition 4 
In  any  stable  equilibrium,  all  agents  of  the  same  social  group  choose  the  same 
combination of skills to acquire. 
 
Proof 
Given the statistical discrimination on the labor market, individuals take the wage for the 
unit  of  their  efficient labor as given with respect to their choice of skills. Therefore, 
individuals  pick  that  combination  of  social  networks  and  thus  skills  that  is the  most 
efficient in production of efficient labor. To prove Proposition 4 by contradiction, assume   27
there is an equilibrium with two individuals from a given social group that are involved 
in two different combinations of social networks. Because the two individuals are free to 
choose between networks, in this equilibrium it must be that the efficiencies of these two 
combinations of social networks for the two individuals in production of efficient labor 
are the same. Such equilibrium is, however, unstable. Any marginal deviation from the 
equilibrium  agent  involvements  across  these  two  different  combinations  of  networks 
causes their efficiencies to differ. As a result, the agent involved in the less efficient set of 
social networks switches to the more efficient one. As above, the reaction of the other 
individuals to the marginal deviations does not stabilize the equilibrium. This completes 
the proof. 
 
Consequently, given statistical discrimination in the labor market, network effects and social 
distances  in  skill  acquisition  coordinate  individuals  such  that  at  most  two  different  efficient 
labors are supplied – minority and majority specific. In this sense, the production function in 
equation (1) can be seen as a harmless simplification of a more general production technology 
with an arbitrary number of kinds of efficient labor. The next section studies equilibrium regimes 
of skill acquisition under specialization. 
4.3.1.  Specialization 
Given Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, in the class of specialization regimes that arise whenever 
( ) f f e 1 + ³  all agents of a given social group choose exactly one and the same network to join 
and skill to acquire under specialization. Accordingly, I consider the five possible allocations of 
social  groups  across  networks  under  specialization  and  test  their  stability.  I  adopt  the  Nash 
concept of equilibrium where agents choose social networks (skills) freely and the equilibrium 
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Proposition 5 
In the class of specialization regimes the following equilibria are always stable in the Nash 
sense: 
1.  Both social groups specialize in their exclusive skills (EE) 
2.  Both social groups join the same inclusive network and specialize in inclusive skills 
(II) 
3.  The minority specializes in exclusive and the majority in inclusive skills (IE) 
The following allocations 
4.  The minority specializes in inclusive and the majority in exclusive skills (EI) 
5.  Social  groups  specialize  in  inclusive  skills,  acquiring  them  in  two  non-connected 
inclusive networks, each composed of members of only one social group (IIS) 










æ + + ³ g d I .                  (16) 
Proof in Appendix 3. 
 
The equilibria in which minority and majority agents choose different types of skills, the EI and 
IE equilibria, substantiate imperfect substitutability of minority and majority efficient labor. 
 
Based on this analysis, the EI equilibrium offers an explanation of the often-observed lesser 
involvement of minorities in (inclusive) formal educational institutions. In particular, if the EI 
equilibrium prevails in the labor market, due to network effects, social distances, and the failure 
to  coordinate,  minority  individuals  prefer  staying  in  their  (exclusive)  kinship  and  family 
networks to individually deviating to formal schooling. 
 
Relative Income under Specialization 
In this section I turn to the income ratio in specialization regimes. Plugging the result from 
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Specifying  the  network  effects  according  (14),  in  the  EI  and  IE  equilibria  we  obtain  the 
following expressions for relative incomes 
( )
( )


































































w ,        (17) 
where r denotes the equilibrium regime. Because, recalling the assumption about the perfect 
substitutability of skills of the same type, exclusive or inclusive, in the EE and IIS equilibria the 
elasticity of substitution between the two kinds of efficient labors  U is infinite and the relative 
wealth is   
( )
( )


































w .           (18) 
In the II equilibrium, where agents acquire the same skill, there are both minority and majority 

























































II .            (19) 
From  equations  (18)  and  (19)  it  is  clear  that  minority  individuals  are  poorer  than  majority 
individuals under the EE, II, and IIS regimes due to the lower network effects they benefit from. 
In particular,  ( ) { } IIS II EE r for I
r , , 1 Î < w . One needs to realize that this relationship is purely 
determined by the individual income effect that rewards social groups for their size. In particular, 
it can be shown that these equilibria predict that larger minorities are better off and thus conflict 
with the scale puzzle.  
 
On the other hand, the EI and IE equilibria give rise to  U< as agents acquire different skills, 
one social group inclusive and the other one exclusive skills. Given the result in equation (17), I 
state one of the two central propositions of this paper.   30
Proposition 6 
There are stable specialization regimes of societal organization that give rise to patterns 
of inequality consistent with the scale puzzle for a range of minority relative sizes I. In 
particular,  in  the  EI  and  IE  regimes  where  minority  and  majority  efficient  labors  are 
imperfect  substitutes  or,  technically,  U  is  finite,  equation  (17)  produces  a  U-shaped 
relationship between Z and I such that there is a downward sloping segment of the Z(I) 
curve that is below one whenever U is large enough. 
Proof in Appendix 4. 
 
The  shape  of  the  Z


















This  analysis  demonstrates  that  the  EI  and  IE  segregation  regimes  produce  labor  income 
distribution  consistent  with  the  scale  puzzle  for  empirically  relevant  range  of  values  of  I 
whenever  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  minority  and  majority  efficient  labors  is 
sufficiently large.
29 Moreover, I find support for the hypothesis that the relationship between the 
relative minority-majority income and minority percentage is convex, as suggested by Blalock 
(1956, 1957). In particular, under the conditions in Proposition 6,  Z
r(I) is above one for I, 
                                                 
29 For example, for parametric values I=1, J=1,and U=10 the range of I where the Z(I) curve is downward sloping 
and below one is from 3.2% to 16.3%. If I=0.8, J=0.7,and U=8.5, the predicted range is 6.8% to 20.2%. Note that if 
the true relationship is convex as in Figure 1, the most widely tested linear relationship between  Z and I would 
exhibit the scale puzzle for much wider ranges of I.    31
below one for some I±(0, 0.5), and one for I=0.5.
30 Because the Z
r(I) is a smooth and continuous 
function of I, there must exist a convex segment thereof on the range I±(0, 0.5). From Figure 1 it 
is also apparent that the theory predicts that small minorities receive larger labor income than 
majorities in IE and EI regimes.   
 
Proposition 7 
Under  the  EI  and  IE  regimes  there  exists  I   small  enough  such  that  ( ) 1 = I w   and  a 
minority of size  ( ) I I , 0 Î  earns higher per capita labor income than the majority.
31  
  Proof in Appendix 4. 
 
Accordingly,  the  analysis  above  explains  why  some  minorities  outperform  majorities  on  the 
labor  market.  In  particular,  it  is  the  scarcity  of  minority  specific  human  capital  that,  if  the 
minority is small enough, drives the unit price of minority efficient labor so high as to overweigh 
the disadvantage of minority individuals from their lower human capital caused by their lesser 
efficiency in human capital acquisition such that minority earnings are higher than those of the 
majority. In the following sections I investigate whether the scale puzzle can be theoretically 
explained if e  is relatively small such that diversification arises. 
4.3.2.  Diversification 
As argued above, diversification regimes arise in the equilibrium if and only if the two types of 
skills  are  complements  or  poor  substitutes,  such  that  ( ) f f e 1 + < .  Recalling  that  in 
diversification  regimes  all  agents  acquire  both  exclusive  and  inclusive  skills,  besides  the 
optimality  condition  in  equation  (8),  the  arbitrage  condition  in  equation  (11)  holds  as  well. 
Because all agents of a given type choose the same set of networks and thus skills to acquire, as 
we know from Proposition 4, two different equilibrium regimes can arise. In the D regime both 
social  groups  acquire  their  exclusive  skills  in  their  group-specific  social  networks  and  their 
inclusive skills in one integrated inclusive social network. In the DS regime, on the other hand, 
                                                 
30 C.f. the proof of Proposition 6. 









æ + + ³ g d I  for  ( ) I I , 0 Î .   32
the inclusive skills are obtained in two non-connected minority- and majority-only (segregated) 
inclusive social networks.  
 
Proposition 8 
The D regime of diversification is always stable. The DS regime is stable if and only if 
the inequality (16) holds.  
Proof in Appendix 5. 
 
An example of the D regime is the situation in which white and black (exclusive) families are 
segregated  but  (inclusive)  workplaces  are  integrated.  On  the  other  hand,  the DS equilibrium 
corresponds  to  the  situation  in  which  workplaces  are  also  segregated  because  people  prefer 
working with the members of their own social group to individually deviating to the workplaces 
where  the  other  social  group  prevails,  although  workplaces  are  inclusive  and  do  not 
institutionally  prohibit  integration.
32  In  this  sense  I  call  the  D regime integrated and the DS 
regime segregated. Note, however, that there is a degree of segregation in the D regime as well, 
as the exclusive networks are segregated. I discuss the D and DS equilibria one by one in the 
following sections. 
 



















, .  For 
expositional convenience, I adopt here the network effects specification from equation (15), that 
is, I assume that network effects depend on the number of network members only. This network 
effect  specification  and  the  fact  that  all  agents  join  all  permissible  networks  under  the 
diversification regime result in the following specifications of relative times spent in any social 
networks: 
  
                                                 




















































































j     (20)  
 
Recalling  that  ( ) f f e 1 + <   under  the  D  regime,  from  the  results  above  we  observe  that  all 
agents spend more time in exclusive networks than in inclusive ones whenever the two types of 
skills are complements. This result arises as the consequence of the complementarity that forces 
agents to compensate for the lower efficiency of exclusive networks by the longer times spent in 
exclusive networks. On the other hand, if the skills are substitutes and the D regime arises, all 
agents spend more time in inclusive networks. Finally, if the technology of combining skills is 
Cobb-Douglas and  1 = e , individuals spend equal shares of their times in exclusive and inclusive 
networks
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Under  the  D  regime,  minority  individuals  spend  relatively  more  time  in  exclusive 
networks  than  majority  individuals  whenever  1 < e   such  that  complementarity  of 
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Proof in Appendix 6.  
 
                                                 
33 Certainly, this is the consequence of the assumption that the acquisition of exclusive and inclusive skills is equally 
efficient, as are the skills themselves in formation of efficient labor. Cobb-Douglass case is not the focus here, as the 
allocation of time is arbitrary in this case and is fully determined by the efficiencies of skill acquisition process, thus 
the parameters of the model. 
34 The proof is omitted, it is straightforward to observe in the specifications of 
D
i t  and 
D
j t  above that the terms in 
parenthesis are less than one, as I<0.5 and social distance is positive.      34
These results stem from the relatively smaller efficiency of the internal networks of the minority 
as compared to those of the majority. As a result, if skills are complements, as compared to the 
majority,  minority  individuals  spend  more  time  in  their  exclusive  networks  in  order  to 
compensate for this handicap. This finding reveals that the often-observed lesser involvement of 
minorities in formal educational institutions, as compared to the majority population, can be 
explained under the D regime of diversification as well. If the skills that minority students obtain 
at home through family socializing are complementary to those that they obtain in schools, these 
students spend relatively less time in schools than their majority counterparts. The opposite result 
holds whenever skills are substitutes and diversification prevails. The most important insight, 
however, is that minority and majority individuals choose different combinations of skills in the 
equilibrium.   
 
Proposition 10 
Social groups of different sizes choose different skill compositions in the D regime of 
























Proof in Appendix 6. 
 
Thus, even though minority agents under some circumstances spend more time in their exclusive 
networks  in  the  D  regime,  they  unambiguously  acquire  relatively  less  exclusive  skills  than 
majority individuals. The essential result here is that skill composition is different across social 
groups under the D regime of diversification. Therefore, the elasticity of substitution between 
efficient labors of minority and majority individuals is finite in the D regime.
35  
 
                                                 
35 Note that it is sufficient that minority and majority individuals have different relative incentives to spend time in 
exclusive  and  inclusive  networks  to  obtain  this  result.  Considering  workplace  inclusive  networks  and  family 
exclusive networks, to establish the main results of the paper it suffices that network effects in minority and majority 
exclusive networks – families of approximately similar sizes – are the same for the respective individuals and there 
is less minority than majority individuals in the average inclusive network – the workplace. The analysis in the main 
text where the sizes of exclusive networks differ depend on group sizes better reflect the case where exclusive 
networks stand for ghettos, neighborhoods, and the like.    35
Turning to the diversification regime when minority and majority agents join two disconnected 
inclusive networks, the DS regime, it is obvious that for any individual inclusive and exclusive 
networks she is involved in provide the same network effects, as they are of the same size and 
composition. Therefore, she distributes her time such that she spends half of her time in the 
exclusive network and the other half in the inclusive network. In effect, in the DS regime both 
minority and majority individuals have the same skill compositions, their efficient labors are 
perfectly substitutable on the labor market, and they receive the same wage per unit of their 
efficient labor.  
Relative Income under Diversification 
Knowing the time allocation in the D regime, I now return to the income ratio. Plugging the 
relative supply of efficient labor (13) into (4), the relative income under the D regime is
36 
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I ,  (21) 
where, realizing that all individuals join all permissible networks, 
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36 The full version of this equation is in Appendix 6.   36
Proposition 11 
The D regime of societal organization gives rise to patterns of inequality consistent with 
the scale puzzle for a range of minority relative sizes I whenever the finite  U is large 
enough  and  1 ¹ e .  In  particular,  for  such  U,  equation  (21)  produces  a  U-shaped 
relationship between Z and I such that there is a downward sloping segment of the Z(I) 
curve that is below one. 
Proof in Appendix 8. 
 
The  shape  of  the  ( ) I
D w   schedule  under  the  D  regime  of  diversification  is  depicted  for  the 

















In effect, in the D regime the theoretically predicted pattern of income inequality is consistent 
with the scale puzzle for a range of minority relative sizes, similarly as in the specialization 
regimes EI and IE. Similarly to the argument about convexity of the  ( ) I w  relationship under the 
EI and IE regimes, whenever  U is large enough and finite,  ( ) I
D w  also exhibits (segments of) 
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Proposition 12 
Under the D regime there exists I  small enough such that  ( ) 1 = I w  and a minority of size 
( ) I I , 0 Î  earns higher per capita labor income than the majority.
37  
   
Proof:  
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 7, from the first step of the proof in Appendix 4 it is 
clear that  Z(I) from equation (21) attains values higher than 1 for I small enough. This 
completes the proof. 
 
In the DS regime, however, minority and majority agents choose the same skill composition and, 
therefore, the elasticity of substitution between their efficient labors U is infinite. Using this result 
and the facts that individuals divide their time evenly between acquisition and utilization of skills 
and that network effects are 
g I  for minority individuals and ( )
g I - 1  for majority individuals in 
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DS , or, in words, in the DS regime minority individuals are always 
poorer than majority individuals. In conflict with the scale puzzle, equation (22) predicts that 
larger minorities lag less.  
 
4.4. The Predictions of The Equilibrium Regimes and The Scale Puzzle 
Having  analyzed  the  patterns  of  predicted  income  inequality  under  the  different  equilibrium 
regimes, it is worthwhile to summarize which equilibria are congruent with the scale puzzle and 
the other empirical regularities. It has been shown that the EE, II, IIS, and DS equilibria predict 
that minorities lag under any parametric conditions. These equilibria, however, conflict with two 
empirical  observations.  First,  the  observation  that  some  minorities  outperform  majorities 
conflicts  with  the  predictions  of  these  equilibria.  Second,  in  conflict  with  the  scale  puzzle, 
according to these equilibria larger minorities lag behind majorities less than smaller ones. The 
                                                 
37 We know that the D regime is stable for any I.   38
EI, IE, and D equilibria, on the other hand are congruent with the scale puzzle whenever the 
elasticity  of  substitution  between  minority  and  majority  efficient  labors  is  high  enough.  In 
particular, under this condition, there is a range of minority relative size where minorities lag and 
the more so the relatively larger they are. In addition, these equilibria predict that small enough 
minorities outperform majorities.  
 
It  is  worthwhile  to  note  that  I  have  adopted  a  conservative  approach  throughout  the  paper, 
assuming that the elasticity of substitution between efficient labors composed of external skills 
acquired in different social networks, minority and majority specific, is infinite. One could argue, 
however, that the sociocultural difference between minorities and majorities suffice to produce 
imperfect substitutability of such efficient labors on the labor market. If this is the case, the EE 
and DS equilibria behave similarly to the EI, IE, and D equilibria and in the same way agree with 
the scale puzzle and the other empirical observations as well.  
 
4.5. The Historicity of Prevailing Equilibria 
Technically,  which  particular  regime  prevails  in  the  labor  market  is  indeterminate up  to  the 
elasticity of substitution between skills in production efficient labor e , the degree of decreasing 
returns to scale in skill acquisition I, and the stability of the EI, IIS, and DS equilibria. First, the 
parameters  e   and  I  determine  whether  specialization  or  diversification  regimes  prevail,  as 
depicted in Proposition 2. Second, if the economy starts in the EI, IIS, or DS allocation and the 
social distance or minority diminishes enough, the economy tips into the II equilibrium in the 
former two cases and into the D equilibrium in the last case. The reason is that minority agents 
switch  from  their  segregated  network,  exclusive  or  inclusive,  respectively,  to  the  inclusive 
network of the majority as this gives higher benefits to any minority individual. In this sense, 
which equilibria prevail in practice is largely historically determined.   
 
Can anything be said about which equilibria are more likely to prevail? To answer this question 
fully  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  yet  some  cautious  predictions  can  be  made.  If,  for 
example, minority entered the larger majority dominated society in small groups or individually, 
one could argue that the II equilibrium is more likely than the EI and IIS equilibria and that the D 
equilibrium  is  more  likely  than  the  DS  equilibrium,  as  the  stability  condition  for  the  latter   39
equilibria could hardly hold in this case as the effective I was small. If we then, for example, 
believe that exclusive and inclusive skills are good substitutes and there is a moderate degree of 
decreasing returns in skill acquisition such that  ( ) f f e 1 + ³ , under the aforementioned mode of 
entry the II equilibrium that contradicts the scale puzzle is likely to prevail. If, however, skills 
are  complements  or  poor substitutes and the condition above is violated, the D equilibrium, 
which  generates  the  scale  puzzle  prediction,  is  likely  to  prevail.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
minority entered the labor market in large communities, the EI and DS equilibria were not likely 
to tip into the corresponding integrated equilibria and are in this sense more likely to prevail. The 
degree  of  coordination  is  also  a  key  factor  in  determining  the  prevailing  equilibria.  If,  for 
example, the minority community is divided or very heterogeneous, coordination is less likely 
and  for  example  the  EI  equilibrium  is  less  likely  to  topple  into  the  II  equilibrium.  Detailed 
empirical  investigation  is  necessary  to  investigate  these  issues  in  a  greater  depth.  Certainly, 
available empirical evidence described above points at either of the EI, IE, or D equilibria that 
predict patterns of income inequality consistent with the scale puzzle. 
 
5.  The Roles of Integration and Exclusion 
 
In this paper integration has a distinct role in determining relative income of minorities that 
challenges  the  habitual  belief  that  integration  necessarily  leads  to  greater  equality  of  social 
groups.  While  it  is  true  that  both  minority  and  majority  individuals  benefit from integration 
through  the  increased  network  effects  that  integration  brings  about,  integration  also  hurts 
minority individuals whenever it obliterates the inter-group substitution effect that benefits the 
smaller social group. In other words, it is possible that integration decreases the relative income 
of  minority  individuals,  if  the  obliteration  of  the  inter-group  substitution  effect  offsets  the 
relatively larger benefits that minority agents receive from integration through the individual 
income effect.
38 Proposition 13 below states that this is possible in the case of integration from 
the  EI  or  IE  regime  into  the  II  regime.  It  is  worthwhile  to  note  that,  in  contrast  to  the 
specialization regimes, integration produces imperfect substitutability under the diversification 
                                                 
38 Minority individuals benefit from integration relatively more than majority individuals do, as they gain access to 
social interaction with the larger pool of majority individuals as compared to the access to the smaller group of 
minority individuals gained by majority individuals.   40




There exist parametric values and I such that integration from EI or IE equilibrium into 
the II equilibrium hurts minority individuals such that their relative income Z decreases 
with  integration,  that  is,  ( ) ( ) ( ) I I I
II IE EI w w w > = .  Moreover,  if  G>0  and  U  is  large 
enough, there exists I such that minority is poorer than majority under EI and IE regimes 
and this inequality increases with integration, or,  ( ) ( ) ( ) I I I




Because  ( ) 1 < I
II w  and there always exists I such that  ( ) ( ) 1 > = I I
IE EI w w  (c.f. Appendix 
4), it must be that  ( ) ( ) ( ) I I I
II IE EI w w w > =  for some I. Moreover, we know that if  U is 
large enough there exists I such that  ( ) ( ) 1 < = I I
IE EI w w . We also know that in this case 
there also exists I such that  ( ) ( ) 1 = = I I
IE EI w w  and the functions  ( ) I
EI w  and  ( ) I
EI w  are 
continuous.  Because  ( ) 1 < I
II w   for  all  I  whenever  G>0,  there  exists  I  such  that 
( ) ( ) ( ) I I I
II IE EI w w w > = > 1 . This completes the proof.  
 
Exclusion  in  exclusive  networks  has  insofar  been  accepted  as  an  exogenous  institutional 
constraint  on  agents’  behavior.  Although  it  is  fully  symmetric  across  social  groups  and  is 
supported by overwhelming evidence, it is sensible to put this constraint under scrutiny, as it 
prevents agents from individually benefiting from integration in all except the II equilibria. In 
particular, it is informative to ask whether the explanation of the scale puzzle developed in this 
paper remains valid, or, in other words, whether the EI, IE and D equilibria remain stable, if 
agents in exclusive networks permit inclusion of individuals from the other social group. The 
answer is yes, if the excluded agents individually choose not to join exclusive networks of the 
other social group even when allowed to do so. This is the case whenever social distance is large   41
enough such that the inequality (16) holds.
39 Under this condition, taking the D equilibrium as 
the original state, while minority and majority individuals are integrated in their workplaces, they 
remain  segregated  in  their  neighborhoods  even  if  the  institutional  barriers  to  integrate  are 
removed.  In  this  sense,  exclusive  behavior  is  not  necessary  to  sustain  differentiation  of 
individuals’ efficient labors across social groups. In particular, if there exist two different (types 
of)  skills  and  a  degree  of  segregation  in  skill  acquisition  prevails,  as  in  the  EI,  IE,  and  D 
equilibria,  network  effects  and  social  distances  are  sufficient  to  perpetuate  this  segregation 
whenever the inequality above holds. It is this segregation resulting in skill differentiation across 
social groups that gives rise to both the inter-group substitution and individual income effects as 
described  above  and  thus  generates  patterns  of  income  inequality  consistent  with  the  scale 
puzzle. This generalizes the argument of the paper to societies without institutional exclusion. 
  
6.  Conclusions 
 
This paper provides theoretical explanation of the persistent patterns of the income inequality 
between  minorities  and  majorities.  Namely,  I  have  shown  that  network  effects  and  social 
distances  in  skill  acquisition  directly  favor  the  members  of  larger  social  groups  through  the 
individual income effect, and that, coupled with asymmetric information in the labor market, 
suffice to sustain equilibria in which minority and majority individuals choose different skills or 
combinations of skills and thus supply imperfectly substitutable efficient labors on the labor 
market. In consequence, the prices of minority and majority efficient labors follow the textbook 
economic  law  that  scarcer  goods  sell  at  higher  price  than  the  more  abundant  ones and  thus 
network effects and social distances indirectly, through the inter-group substitution effect, favor 
smaller  social  groups  who  on  aggregate  supply  less  efficient  labor,  ceteris  paribus.  I  have 
established above that the individual income and inter-group substitution effects explain the scale 
puzzle for a wide range of parameters. Importantly, neither discrimination on the labor market, 
nor asymmetry of individual characteristics across social groups is necessary to obtain this result. 
Moreover, elimination of exclusion does not necessarily lead to integration and the segregation 
equilibria that predict the scale puzzle are sustained whenever the size of minority or the social 
                                                 
39 The proof is omitted at this point and is obvious from the proof of Proposition 5 in Appendix 3.   42
distance  between  social  groups  is  large  enough.  An  important  result  of  this  paper  is  that 
integration may increase as well as decrease the relative income of minority as compared to 
majority individuals. In this sense, although there certainly are benefits of integration for both 
minority  and  majority  individuals,  integration  is  not  necessarily  a  universal  remedy  against 
inequality across social groups. The analysis also offers an explanation why minorities tend to 
spend more time in family and neighborhood socializing than in socializing in schools and other 
integrated  social  institutions.  As  shown  in  the  section  about  diversification,  under  some 
circumstances  minority agents need to compensate for the low efficiency of their segregated 
networks  by  spending relatively more time in these networks than in integrated networks as 
compared to majority individuals. If this is the case, increasing the efficiency of integrated social 
networks such as schools may drive minorities out of these institutions. Nevertheless, minority 
agents unambiguously acquire relatively less exclusive skills than the majority individuals under 
the integrated diversification regime. The analysis also predicts that small minorities may benefit 
from the scarcity of their efficient labor to such a degree that it outweighs their disadvantage in 
acquiring  human  capital  and,  as  a  result,  they  outperform  the  majority  in  income  terms.  In 
addition,  as  suggested  in  the  literature,  I  find  some  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  the 
relationship  between  minority-majority  relative  income  and  minority  relative  size  exhibits 
convexity.  Finally,  I  have  clarified  the  role  of  social  organization  of  skill  acquisition  in 
explaining the scale puzzle. 
 
This paper opens several potential areas of future research. First, the analysis of which particular 
regime prevails in which labor market is limited in this paper and thus no predictions are drawn 
for  particular  minorities.  Second,  it  is  worthwhile  to  investigate  the  relative  wealths  of  an 
arbitrary number of social groups in one habitat. Finally, an empirical analysis explicitly testing 
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Take the allocation of time {Tk,x, Tk,n} as given and rewrite the agents’ problem (7) as follows.  














- + - =
- - -
m k
m k m k m k









e e e e e e  
Plugging the technological constraints into the objective function and deriving the first order 
conditions with respect to Lk,m, I find that the optimality conditions on time distribution between 
acquisition  and  utilization  of  skills  are  m k m k T L , , 1 f
f
+
= .  The  sufficiency  conditions  are  also 
satisfied, as the objective function is concave at the optimal allocation. This completes the proof. 
 
Appendix 2 
Substitute  for  Lk,m  in  the  agent’s  problem  (7)  using  the  optimality  conditions  from  (8).  In 
addition, substitute for Sk,m from the skill acquisition technology and use the definition of  m k N ,
~
. 
Consequently, the agent’s problem is: 






























n k x k





T N T N Max


























n k x k





T N T N Max
n k x k
e e
   48
and, obviously, the maximum is the corner solution with the higher  m k N ,
~
 and thus 
) 1 /(
,
~ - e e
m k N . 
 
Now  assume  ( ) f f e 1 + ¹ .  Form  the  Kuhn-Tucker  Lagrangian 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) 1
~ ~
) ( , ,
























  to  obtain  the  first  order  Kuhn-

















































n k x k
n k x k
k n k n k n k
k x k x k x k
k n k n k
k x k x k
T T
T T
H T N T


















First  realize  that  0 ³ k H ,  0
* > k H ,  and  that  both  k H  and 
*
k H  are finite, for any admissible 
parametric  values  on  the  constrained  domain.  The  finiteness  follows  from  the  limited  time 
resources and the fact that, for any admissible parametric values, the production technology of 
efficient labor does not permit infinite output with limited resources. Moreover, it is always 
possible to allocate some resources to production of efficient labor such that it is positive and 
thus  0
* > k H . Now, to satisfy the first two Kuhn-Tucker conditions realize that O > 0, otherwise 
both Tk,x and Tk,n would have to be zero implying  0
* = k H , which is inadmissible. Therefore, the 
time constraint is binding. 
 
Now use the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to study the corner solution Tk,x = 0 and Tk,n = 1. Realize 
that  ( ) { } { } ( ) 0 1
~
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x k x k T N  is finite (and well defined). This is the case 
whenever the exponent is larger than zero, that is, whenever  ( ) f f e 1 + > . This condition is thus 
the necessary condition for the studied corner solution to be the maximum. By symmetry, the 
same  necessary  condition  must  hold  for  the  corner  solution  Tk,n  =  0  then  Tk,x = 1 to be the 
maximum. 
 
If Tk,x > 0 and Tk,n > 0, in the interior solution, the first two Kuhn-Tucker conditions are equalities 
and we obtain the following result, where the definitions of  m k N ,
~
 are used. 
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There  are  three  possible  candidates  for  the  maximum,  two  corner solutions and one interior 
solution. Given the results above, evaluating the objective function at each of these candidates, 
the values of Hk at the candidate time allocations are  
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Now I verify the sufficient conditions under each of these candidates is the maximum. Note that 
from the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions the time constraint is binding and therefore we can 















































Consider the new objective function on the constrained domain. If it is convex for any Tk,x>0 
from the constrained domain, that is if its second derivate is positive at any permissible Tk,x>0, 
then the interior candidate cannot be the maximum. Now I prove that the objective function is 
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Now it is straightforward to see that 
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and  that  the  term  on  the  right  hand  side  has  a  positive  sign  for  all  Tk,x>0  whenever 
( ) f f e f fe 1 0 1 + > Û > - - .  Thus,  the  interior  solution  cannot  be  the  maximum  if 
( ) f f e 1 + > . As argued above, the objective function is certainly continuous and bounded on 
the constrained domain. Therefore, there must exist a maximum. Having excluded the interior 
candidate, the corner solution with the higher m k N ,
~
 and thus 
) 1 /(
,
~ - e e
m k N  is the maximum on the 
constrained domain.  
 
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we know that if  ( ) f f e 1 + < , none of the corner candidates 
can be the maximum. As above, because the objective function is continuous and bounded on the 
constrained  domain,  there  must  exist  a  maximum.  Being  the  only  remaining  possibility,  the 
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Recall that, due to statistical discrimination, employers differentiate wages per unit of efficient 
labor across social groups but not within groups and that individuals cannot change their group 
membership. Therefore, agents pick those networks to acquire skills that they are allowed to join 
and that offer the largest network effects and thus are the most efficient. Applying (8) to network 
effect specification in (14), the network effects are: 
                                                 







+  and 
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e  fully determine the properties of the maximization problem. The lengthier and more formal approach was 
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where the superscript r ± {EE, II, EI, IE} denotes the prevailing regime. The network effects in 










































Because network effects in exclusive networks are always larger than the zero network effects 
that a single agent would face upon deviation to the inclusive network of zero size, the EE 
equilibrium is always stable. Consider now the II equilibrium. The network effects in inclusive 
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Therefore,  the  II  equilibrium  is  always  stable.  Now  investigate  the  IE  equilibrium. Here  the 
stability conditions are 
g g
d



















Both of these conditions are always satisfied and, consequently, the IE equilibrium is always 
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The first condition holds if the minority (or social distance) is large enough. Obviously, the 
second condition holds always. Now consider the IIS regime. In any stable IIS regime it must be 
that agents prefer staying in the inclusive networks occupied by their own social group, enjoying 
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J I . 
This completes the proof. 
 
Appendix 4  
Recall I+J=1, I±[0, 0.5]. Realize that the Z(I) curve is continuous for all admissible parametric 
values and I>0. At I=0 it is continuous from the right. The rest of the proof consists of three 
steps. First, we show that the Z(I) is larger than one at I0 whenever U is finite, that is, the Z(I) 




















































































The second step demonstrates that Z(I)=1 at I=0.5, that is, equally large social groups are equally 
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In the last step it is shown that for some parametric values the Z(I) curve is upward sloping at 
I=0.5. 























Therefore, the continuous Z(I) curve starts above one and reaches the point Z(0.5)=1 from below 
if the parametric condition holds. As a result, there must be a segment of the Z(I) curve that is 
downward  sloping  and  where  Z(I)<1.  There  always  exists  U*>0  such  that  the  parametric 























Having these results and recalling the continuity of Z(I), there exists I  such that  ( ) 1 = I w  and for 
[ ) I I , 0 Î  minority individuals have larger income than majority individuals, that is,  Z(I) >1 in 
this range.  
This completes the proof. 
 
Appendix 5 
Recall that, agents always pick those networks to acquire skills that they are allowed to join and 
that offer the largest network effects and thus are the most efficient. The only possibility for an 
individual to deviate in the equilibrium where both social groups acquire inclusive skills in one 
inclusive social network is to form his own inclusive social network. Because such network 
would offer zero network benefits, as compared to substantial network benefits in the integrated 
inclusive network, such deviation is never profitable and therefore the equilibrium is stable. 
 
If, on the other hand, inclusive skills are acquired in two segregated inclusive networks, for this 
regime  to  be  stable  it  must  be  that  all  individuals  prefer  staying  in  the  inclusive  networks 
occupied  by  their  own  social  group,  enjoying  network  effects 
g I N
DS
n i = ,   and 
g J N
DS
n j = ,   to 




























































J I . This completes the proof. 
 
Appendix 6 
Here I prove the inequality in Proposition 10 and the preceding inequalities.  
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This completes the proof. 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 8  
 
To prove this proposition, I state and prove the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1: 
There is always I>0 such that h(I)<1; H1. 
 
Proof (superscript D omitted): 
1)  ( ) ( )
5 . 0 5 . 0 ® ® =
I j I i I H I H , by the symmetry in this case. 
2)  ( ) ( )
0 0 ® ® <
I j I i I H I H  and both well defined if H1   57
3) Hi and Hj are continuous in I on the domain. 
If 1), 2), and 3) then there exists I*>0 such that  ( ) ( ) * * I H I H j i <  and thus  ( ) 1 * < I h . 
 












































































































































































I i I H  
































































I i I H . Now consider 
( )








I j I H . Moreover,  2
1
1



























































































































I i I H .  
 
Having this result, dividing both sides of equation by 2, we obtain  
Lemma 2: 
























































I prove that the left hand inequality indeed holds and then the whole implication. Realize that 











































e .   58




































e . Due to the second inequality and noting that the 
term in the brackets in Claim 1 is larger or equal to one, we can take away the powers without 


















































  the  left  hand  side  inequality  in 
Lemma 2  holds  and  it  must  be  that  ( ) ( )
0 0 ® ® £













,  and 
( ) ( )
0 0 ® ® <
I j I i I H I H .  If  G,  we  obtain  ( ) ( )
0 0 ® ® <
I j I i I H I H   directly  from  the  inequality 


















, 0 2 2
I j I i I H I H . Thus  ( ) ( )
0 0 ® ® <
I j I i I H I H  in Case A. 
 












e .  As  in  Case  A,  we  can  take  away  the 
powers  but  the  direction  of  the  inequality  must  be  changed  because  of  the  powers  are  now 


















































 prove that the inequality in Lemma 2 
holds and that  ( ) ( )
0 0 ® ® <
I j I i I H I H  in Case B as well. Therefore, Cases A and Case B together 
prove that the  ( ) ( )
0 0 ® ® <
I j I i I H I H  and  ( ) 1
0 <
® I I h  for all admissible parametric values. 
   59
This  proves  Lemma  1.  Hence,  there  exists  I*>0  such  that  ( ) ( ) * * I H I H j i <   and  thus 
( ) 1 * < I h under the D regime and we can proceed with the proof of Proposition 11. 
 
















= , take the limit of  ( ) I
D w  as  U approaches infinity.  




























 As we see, this limit is equal to  ( ) I h
D  which, 
from Lemma 1, is less than 1 for some I*. It is because as U grows, the inter-group substitution 














I D  approaches 1. Thus, there is a point I* at which 
the individual income effect dominates the inter-group substitution effect for  U very large and 
( ) 1 * < I
D w . In fact, it suffices that  ( ) ( )
















r  at I=I* to obtain that  ( ) 1 * < I
D w . 
Note that the inter-group substitution effect diminishes and approaches the lower bound zero 
while the individual income effect is constant as U increases. 
 
Similarly to the first two steps of the proof of Proposition 6,  ( ) I
D w  approaches infinity as I 
approaches zero and is one as I=0.5. Adding the fact that for U large enough there is I such that 
( ) 1 < I
D w  suffices to ensure that the  ( ) I
D w  curve must at some point cross the  ( ) 1 = I
D w  line 
from above and that there must be a segment of this curve that lies below the  ( ) 1 = I
D w  line and 

















D .  Such  function 
conflicts with the prediction that minorities tend to earn less than majorities. This completes the 
proof. 
 